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Abstract
We estimate the effects of universal cash transfers on crime from Alaska’s Permanent Fund
Dividend, an annual lump-sum payment to all Alaska residents. We find a 14% increase in
substance-abuse incidents the day after the payment and a 10% increase over the following
four weeks. This is partially offset by a 8% decrease in property crime, with no changes in
violent crimes. On an annual basis, however, changes in criminal activity from the payment
are small. Estimated costs comprise a very small portion of the total payment, suggesting
that crime-related concerns of a universal cash transfer program may be unwarranted.
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1 Introduction
Universal Basic Income (UBI) has gained renewed attention in recent years in response to
declining job security and for addressing distributional welfare issues more generally (Thig-
pen, 2016). UBI constitutes a universal and unconditional cash transfer that is provided
to all residents (or citizens) on a long-term basis, regardless of income, with no “strings at-
tached” (Marinescu, 2017). Proponents primarily describe UBI’s ability to improve economic
security (Thigpen, 2016), while others have proposed it as a substitute for existing welfare
programs. A common concern regarding UBI, however, is that universal cash transfers may
have unintended consequences. For example, several previous studies have found that cash
transfer programs increase crime, mortality, and the consumption of “temptation goods,”
such as drugs and alcohol (e.g., Riddell and Riddell, 2006; Dobkin and Puller, 2007; Evans
and Moore, 2011; Borraz and Munyo, 2014; Castellari et al., 2017). However, other studies
have found no effect on mortality and reductions in crime (e.g., Foley, 2011; Mejia and Ca-
macho, 2013; Cotti et al., 2016; Carr and Packham, 2018), suggesting that the type of cash
transfer and the setting in which cash transfers take place matters. Previously studied cash
transfers stem from conditional cash or in-kind transfer programs, such as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); universal and unconditional cash transfers, however,
are distinct from these programs because the entire population receives the transfer and there
are no restrictions on how the payments are spent by the recipients. Criminal behavior may
therefore respond differently to UBI than to conditional cash and in-kind transfers estimated
previously.
In this paper, we provide the first estimates of the effects of a universal and uncondi-
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tional income receipt on crime using the world’s only continuous universal income program—
Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD)—as a case study. The PFD is an annual and un-
conditional lump-sum payment to Alaska residents based on the investment earnings of the
Alaska Permanent Fund, the state’s sovereign wealth fund, and provided to all Alaska resi-
dents (subject to eligibility rules), regardless of income. We estimate the short-run effects of
the PFD on daily counts of policing incidents related to violence, controlled-substance abuse,
property crime, and requested medical assistance using police reports in the Municipality of
Anchorage, Alaska’s largest city, between 2000 and 2016. We exploit the exogenous timing
and amount of the PFD payment to identify the average treatment effect of the PFD on the
daily counts and type of incidents. We find payment receipt increases the average daily num-
ber of substance-abuse incidents (10%) and incidents of police medical assistance (9%), but
decreases property crime incidents (8%) in the four weeks after the PFD is issued, with no
average change in violent crimes. Although these changes are statistically significant, they
represent modest changes on an annual basis. The observed increase in substance-abuse
crime is 1.05% of the annual level, while the declines in property crime are similarly modest
at -0.61%. In terms of monetized social cost, the net effect of these changes ranges between
social savings of $328 thousand to expenditures of $3.44 million, amounting to just +0.17%
to -1.78% of the 2016 PFD distribution to Anchorage residents.
The primary implication of the life-cycle model with a perfect credit market is that con-
sumption and economic behavior should not respond to the arrival of anticipated income. Re-
cent work demonstrates, however, that people tend to exhibit short-run impatience, whereby
consumption and economic activity increase immediately following cash transfers, thereby vi-
olating the permanent income hypothesis (e.g., Stephens, 2003; Shapiro, 2005; Stephens and
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Unayama, 2011; Kueng, 2018). Short-run impatience implies that cash transfers constitute
income shocks, which may influence the decision to engage in crime. According to Becker’s
(1968) seminal model of crime, an individual is less likely to engage in illicit activity if their
opportunities for legitimate income are improved from higher wages or better employment
prospects. This relationship between earned income and crime has received considerable
empirical support (e.g., Machin and Meghir, 2004; Lin, 2008; Blakeslee and Fishman, 2018;
Bignon et al., 2017). In contrast, the theoretical relationship between unearned income
and crime is less clear because, unlike earned income, the decision to engage in crime does
not necessarily result in foregone unearned income. Thus, an unearned income shock could
lead to more or less criminal activity, depending on the mechanisms at play and how they
influence the expected utility of engaging in criminal activity.
In the presence of short-run impatience and credit constraints, the arrival of an unearned
income shock from a cash transfer may influence the expected net utility of criminal activity
through several mechanisms. For example, an income effect from the cash transfer could
relieve financially stressed individuals, thereby reducing the need to engage in financially
motivated crimes, such as burglary, robbery, and theft (e.g., Foley, 2011; Mejia and Camacho,
2013; Chioda et al., 2016; Carr and Packham, 2018). The income effect can also act in the
opposite direction as cash recipients increase consumption of normal goods, including those
that are complements to crime, such as leisure, drugs, and/or alcohol (Riddell and Riddell,
2006; Dobkin and Puller, 2007; Evans and Popova, 2014; White and Basu, 2016; Castellari
et al., 2017). A cash transfer may also increase the supply of cash and purchased goods
available to potential offenders in the streets, thereby increasing the expected utility of
crime through a “loot effect,” leading to an increase in financially motivated crimes (Borraz
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and Munyo, 2014; Wright et al., 2017). The expected utility of crime may also increase from
a cash transfer through a peer effect if several individuals are receiving the transfer at the
same time, thereby creating a social multiplier in crime (e.g., Damm and Dustmann, 2014;
Billings et al., 2016). Finally, if the day of a cash transfer is a highly anticipated and salient
event, it may also generate a “party effect,” much in the same way college football game
days lead to an increase in assaults, vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct, and arrests
for alcohol-related offenses (Lindo et al., 2018).
While there is ample support of crime-related effects from cash transfers (e.g., Foley, 2011;
Mejia and Camacho, 2013; Borraz and Munyo, 2014; Cotti et al., 2016; Chioda et al., 2016;
Carr and Packham, 2018), UBI payments are distinct from other payment types—such as
in-kind benefits, conditional cash transfers, public pensions, or unemployment insurance—in
several respects, and may therefore induce different behavioral responses to cash transfers
than those estimated in previous studies. UBI recipients constitute a broader and more
diverse socioeconomic group relative to the segments of the population considered previ-
ously, such as the elderly (pension/social security payments) or low-income earners (SNAP
payments), which likely differ in their income levels, time preferences, and consumption be-
haviors. We provide evidence consistent with a differential per-dollar response for substance
abuse crimes when the PFD is compared to SNAP payments.
Finally, our findings lend insight into universal payment designs. We show that while
property crimes decrease as a result of PFD payment, there are no additional societal gains—
i.e., more decreases in property crime—from the distribution of larger amounts. Substance-
abuse incidents, on the other hand, are responsive to both PFD amounts and increases in the
distribution. Thus, increased benefits from UBI payments may be obtained by spreading out
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payments over multiple installments, as was found for SNAP payments (Carr and Packham,
2018). However, the overall net effect of PFD payments on crime is relatively small at the
annual level, suggesting that crime-related concerns of a UBI program may be unwarranted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief history of
the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend and why it represents a fruitful setting for empirical
research on UBI. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and the empirical strategy used to
estimate the effect of the cash transfers on crime. Section 5 presents the primary findings
of the analysis: the immediate effect of the PFD on crime the day after distribution, the
persistence (or longevity) of the effect, the relationship between crime and the size of the
cash distribution, and a comparison of the PFD-related effect to the effect of other transfers
(SNAP) within Alaska. The implications of our findings for the literature on cash transfer
and the policy debate around UBI are discussed in the final two sections.
2 The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
In 1976, Alaskan voters passed a constitutional amendment to establish the Permanent Fund
(Alaska Constitution, Article IX, Section 15). This amendment dedicated a portion of the
annual oil revenues to a state investment fund, whose balance currently stands at over $61
billion. When the initial fund was created, there was no intention to share earnings with the
public; however, interest in a citizen dividend eventually gained traction, and in 1982, the
first PFD was paid to every resident of the state of Alaska. Since the first distribution, PFD
payments have been determined by a formula that is based on a five-year rolling average
of the fund’s income to produce more stable dividend amounts from year to year. It is
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important to note that the fund is well-diversified across different regions and asset classes;
thus, its returns are not necessarily reflective of Alaska’s economic conditions. State oil
revenue, which originally capitalized the fund, currently represent only 2-3% of annual fund
additions; since 1985 reinvestment of fund earnings is the primary way in which the fund
grows. The average annual aggregate distribution is large enough to be similar in size to
the Gross Domestic Product of many sectors in the Alaska economy. In 2015, for example,
the 976 million dollar distribution was about 42% of the construction sector’s GDP, or 76%
of the whole-trade sector’s. In addition to the sheer size, PFD payments are distributed to
everyone at the same time, which means it is the single largest infusion of money at a given
point in Alaska’s $50 billion economy.
As a case study in universal income, the dividend established an income floor below
which the cash income of residents cannot fall. This cash transfer is particular important in
rural areas where economies lack economic bases and are still a mixture of subsistence and
a small formal economy. Another key feature of the PFD is that amounts are not based on
a person’s income or wealth. Payments are uniformly distributed to all residents—adults
and children–of the state (including green-card holders and refugees) who were residents of
the state in the prior year. Over our study period (2000-2016), average household size was
2.83, average household income was $72,000, and average PFD size per-person was $1,600.
That means that the PFD represents, on average, 6.28% of overall household income. By
coincidence, this is almost exactly the share of earnings generated by the first PFD in 1982.
Since inception the program has become very popular and the public expects it to run in
perpetuity.
Each year the filing period runs from January 1st to March 31st. This leaves the Per-
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manent Fund division about six months to process the applications, determine eligibility,
and handle garnishment requests. The payout month, therefore, is a result of administrative
processes, as opposed to any intentionality on the behalf of the founders of the dividend.
The vast of majority of Alaskans—82.72% as of 2014—receive their PFDs through direct
deposit in the first week of October, while the rest receive checks through the mail. Over
our study period (2000-2016), direct deposits have always been issued either before or on
the same day checks are mailed. More recently (since 2010), both direct deposits and checks
have been issued on the first Thursday of October. Because of the relatively small portion
of the population receiving mailed-checks, and because these checks are never issued before
direct deposits, our primary specifications focus on the first round of direct deposit issuance.
3 Data
We employ a database on reported policing incidents in Alaska’s largest city, the Municipality
of Anchorage. Limiting the study to Anchorage is not particularly narrow in scope, as the
city accounts for a large share (40%) of the state’s total population.1 The primary data for
the analysis are real-time incident reports for officers of the Anchorage Police Department
(APD). An incident report is generated each time an officer calls to report their location
and the nature of their current activity to dispatch. Such reports can be made, for example,
1In 2016, Anchorage’s population stood at just under 300,000, with another 150,000
in the larger metro area. Alaska as a whole recorded 750,000 residents in 2016.
Fairbanks, Alaska’s second largest city, has just 1/10 the population of Anchorage.
(www.census.gov/data/datasets/2016/demo/popest/total-cities-and-towns.html).
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when an officer responds to a 911 call, initiates a traffic stop, services a warrant, or even
reports a meal break. Each time-stamped log entry is associated with a particular activity,
self-reported by the officer, and coded to one of 99 possible activities by the APD.
APD provided us with location de-identified incident reports for the years 2000-2016.
For our analysis, we aggregate these incident-report level data up to counts at the day level
for each activity code. Drawing from the categorization of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and with consultation from APD, we further categorize
and aggregate these specific codes to more general activity types corresponding to violence,
substance abuse, property crimes, noise violations and parties, and police department med-
ical assistance to other agencies. Our aggregation differs from UCR in three ways. First,
UCR reports robbery as a violent crime whereas we categorize it as a property crime (as
it is financially motivated). Second, UCR includes arson as a property crime, but because
it does not necessarily provide direct financial gain to the perpetrator, we omit it. Finally,
UCR does not track substance abuse incidents. Therefore, in consultation with APD, we
determined six incidents to be associated with substance abuse: hit-and-run events, liquor
law violations, problems with a drunk individual, police transportation of a drunk individual
(often for another city agency), drugs and forged prescriptions, and driving while intoxicated.
Hit-and-run violations have been shown to be associated with alcohol consumption (Solnick
and Hemenway, 1994). Liquor law violations tend to be associated with illegal possession
or sale of alcohol, rather than excessive consumption. For robustness, in Appendix tables,
we provide estimates for both an inclusive (Full) and restrictive (Part) categorization of
substance abuse incidents that differ by including hit-and-run and liquor law violations. As
these yield qualitatively similar results, the remainder of the paper only presents the results
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for Substance (Full), which are inclusive of all incidents.
Appendix Table A.1 shows the average daily count of calls received over our sample period
for specific call codes and the more general categories to which they were assigned. Figure
A.1 shows these activities by day-of-week and month of year. Predictable weekday-weekend
and summer-winter patterns are visible in most of the series. For example, substance abuse
calls peak on the weekend, while property crime is low on the weekend as people are spending
time at home.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits two sources of temporal variation to examine the PFD’s effect
on crime. First, we use the discrete intra-annual variation in the day the PFD is issued by
comparing daily behavioral outcomes from the days immediately following the PFD to similar
days of the year that do not experience cash transfers of any kind. Given that the time of
year in which the PFD is issued is determined only by administrative processes, the annual
timing of the PFD is exogenous;2 thus, similar days of the year that do not experience cash
transfers are plausible estimates of the counterfactual of what behavioral outcomes would
have been had the PFD not been issued. A useful feature of this source of variation is
that PFD payments have occurred on different days of the month and different days of the
week over the years in our sample. With variation in the day-of-the-month, the PFD can
be isolated from the effect of other income payments and transfers that occur on a regular
2This observation is based on personal communications with current and former govern-
ment officials involved in the creation of the PFD program.
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schedule each and every month.3 With variation in the day-of-the-week, the PFD can be
separately identified from other regular weekly patterns, such as the effects of the weekend
versus the weekday. As a second source of variation, we use the inter-annual variation in the
size of the PFD payment to both provide additional identification and to explore whether
behavior is sensitive to the amount received. As previously discussed (Section 2), the size
of the PFD is determined based on the returns of a diversified portfolio rather than on
contemporaneous oil prices or specific factors related to the state economy. PFD payment
dates, number of recipients, and amounts are listed for each year in our study period in Table
1.
We estimate four different empirical model specifications to investigate different aspects
of the effect of the cash payment on daily criminal activity. First, we estimate an empirical
model that leverages the exogenous timing of the payment only:
yt = β0 + β1PFDt + γWt +Mt + τt + εt, (1)
3These transfers include food stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF), which are distributed on the first day of each month in Alaska; military pay-
checks, which are distributed on the 1st and 15th of each month (or the nearest busi-
ness day prior); and social security checks, which are distributed on the 2nd, 3rd, and
4th Wednesday of each month. Most salaries in the United States are paid weekly or
every other week (www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-3/how-frequently-do-private-businesses-
pay-workers.htm), creating day-of-the-week patterns in incomes, as opposed to day-of-the-
month-patterns.
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where yt is the count of policing incidents on day t related to either violence, substance abuse,
property crime, noise/parties, or police medical assistance to other agencies (each estimated
separately); PFDt is a dummy variable taking a value of one if t equals the date of the
first PFD distribution and zero for all other days; and εt is the model error. The βi and γ
coefficients are parameters to be estimated. The coefficient of interest, β1, is the estimated
change in the number of incidents y on the first full day after PFD direct deposits are issued.4
We estimate Eq. 1 via OLS using heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent Newey-
West estimates of the covariance matrix (Newey and West, 1987) to address any persistence
in the time series after accounting for month-by-year fixed effects.5
The specification in Eq. 1 includes a number of control variables and fixed effects.
Mt is a vector of month × year (month-by-year) fixed effects, which captures changes to
average incomes, unemployment, population, police department resources, and other similar
effects. Following the daily crime literature (e.g., Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Foley, 2011), Wt
represents a vector of weather control variables (precipitation, maximum daily temperature,
and snow depth), which reduces observed variance and enables more precise estimates. Most
of the seasonal weather effects, however, are captured by the month-by-year fixed effects.
4For example, if the PFD is issued at sometime on Thursday, β1 will capture the effects
of PFDt from Friday at 12:00am to 11:59pm.
5Poisson models were also fitted to address the count nature of the data, but yielded
similar results. These estimates are included in the Appendix Table A.4. We address test-
ing multiple hypotheses for our five outcome variables by using the Bonferroni correction
method. Less conservative corrections were also tested for our main results, but yielded
similar inference.
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τt is a vector of special day, holiday, day-of-week, and day-of-month effects. Specifically,
τ includes day-of-week fixed effects (Monday, Tuesday, etc.), addressing weekend-versus-
weekday effects or intra-week cyclicality, and a 5th-order polynomial day-of-month trend
to account for events that occur on a regular monthly schedule, such as rental payments
and other income receipts (e.g. social security, food stamps, or other welfare receipt). τ also
includes a vector of special day dummy variables, including military pay days (to account for
the predictable pay of Anchorage’s large military population), New Year’s Eve/Day, Super
Bowl Sunday, the day of the Iditarod race start in Anchorage, St Patrick’s Day, Cinco de
Mayo, July 4th, Labor Day and Labor Day weekend, Columbus Day, Halloween/proceeding
weekend, Thanksgiving, Christmas Day, and federal holidays which are given to many public
employees if a major holiday falls on a weekend. Much like weather, including special date
indicator variables allows for more precise effect estimates by reducing the variance in the
counter-factual days.
In our second model specification, we investigate whether there is any persistence in the
PFD-effect beyond the first full day following the distribution by adopting an event-analysis
strategy similar to Evans and Moore (2011): we broaden the time window for the indicator
variable PFDt in Eq. 1 to one-week intervals, from four weeks before the PFD distribution
to four weeks after. Persistence of the PFD effect is estimated from Eq. 2,
yt = β0 +
4∑
i=−4
βiPFDit + γWt + f(t) ∗ Y ear + τt + εt, (2)
where PFDit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if day t is in the ith week before/after
distribution and zero otherwise. We define weeks as the 7-day periods starting from the
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day the PFD is distributed.6 Weather and holiday controls, W and τ , are defined as in
Eq. 1. The eight-week window around the PFD distribution date leaves relatively few
“untreated” October days to offer independent variation for estimating the monthly fixed
effect; instead, we use a 5th-order day-of-year polynomial trend, f(t), to capture seasonal
variation in the observed activity patterns through channels such as income, unemployment
and police department resources. We estimate such a trend for each year by interacting it
with a yearly fixed effect.
Assessing the persistence of the effect of the PFD on our outcomes allows us to determine
if the payment has a net cumulative impact or if the change in behavior immediately following
receipt merely represents an inter-temporal reallocation. In order to avoid conflating the
persistence of first-day recipients (who received PFD by direct deposit) with the effect of
new recipients who receive their PFDs later by check, we narrow our sample period for the
persistence estimates to the years 2010-2016, where direct deposits and checks were issued
to all recipients on the same day.7
An additional motivation for looking at an extended treatment period is that while the
first full day after the PFD distribution experiences particularly intense treatment, the one-
day treatment window may be too short to capture effects that are confined to particular
days of the week. For example, Mondays have the highest daily number of property crime
6In other words, the first week after distribution, i = 1, includes days 1-7 after distribu-
tion; days 8-14 correspond to week i = 2, and so on. The first seven days before the PFD
defines week i = −1; days 8-14 before the distribution defines week i = −2, and so on.
7In most years in the 2000-2009 period, paper checks were mailed one week after direct
deposits were issued. For robustness, we also estimate Eq. 2 on the full sample (Table A.6).
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calls, but no Monday falls the day after a PFD payment. This limits the potential impact
of the treatment effect to days that property crime might be otherwise depressed.
For our third empirical specification, we estimate the marginal response to the size of the
distribution, which additionally leverages the dollar amount paid as a source of identifica-
tion. As shown in Table 1, PFD amounts have varied considerably year-to-year, both in the
amount that each recipient is paid (between 918 and 3,644 2016 USD) and in the number
of individuals who receive their PFD as part of the first round of direct deposit payments.
Consequently, the total amount of cash hitting the street on the first day provides an oppor-
tunity to investigate how changes in the total size of the distribution relate to changes in our
estimated effects. These marginal effects are relevant for policy, as they potentially inform
potential gains from more evenly distributing payments over time (either across or among






t ×amountt+β3weekPFDt ×amount2t +γWt+Mt+τt+εt, (3)
where weekPFDt is a dummy variable taking a value of one if t occurs during the week after
distribution and zero otherwise, and amountt is the total amount of cash dispersed on the
first day (PFD amount × number of first-day recipients) measured in 100 million 2016 USD
(Table 1). The other variables are defined as in Eq. 1. Main effects for amount are not
included because there is no intra-annual variation in the amount of the PFD payments or
first-day recipients; both will be perfectly correlated with month-by-year fixed effects.
Finally, to provide context for our PFD estimates, our fourth specification compares the
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effect of the PFD to changes in police activity stemming from a transfer payment that has
been the focus in previous studies, food stamp (SNAP) payments. We single out the SNAP
program as it is an important social program which provides a predictable and steady stream
of benefits to income and asset-eligible households. SNAP has a large base of participation
and, unlike other programs like Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, payments do not
end after a given amount of time. Several previous studies have analyzed the short-run
effects of income or in-kind transfers using programs such as SNAP (e.g., Shapiro, 2005;
Cotti et al., 2016), or social security payments (e.g, Stephens, 2003; Mastrobuoni and Wein-
berg, 2009; Evans and Moore, 2011). Particularly relevant for our study, Foley (2011) and
Carr and Packham (2018) examine the relationship between crime and the timing of SNAP.
However, such transfer programs have important limitations when considering their implica-
tions for universal income. Social security payments are restricted to the elderly and SNAP
payments to those near or below the poverty level. Differing consumption patterns may be
expected from these sub-groups than for the population as a whole. Further, SNAP pro-
vides in-kind benefits which can only be spent on certain grocery items. Because universal
income is sometimes discussed as a substitute or complement for more traditional welfare
programs, comparing the behavioral responses of PFD receipt to those for such welfare pro-
grams provides insight into how these programs might differ. To our knowledge, no studies
to date have explored the differential effect of cash transfers on crime between universal and
non-universal transfer programs on a per-person basis.
For this comparison, we exploit both the discrete first-day-of-the-month timing for Alaskan
SNAP payments and the total size of these monthly distribution. The per-household SNAP
benefits in Alaska depend on the household size, income, and location (urban, rural, or
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remote). Over our study period, statewide SNAP participation was approximately 65,000
individuals, or about 9.5% of the state’s population. On average, about $10 million is paid
in total benefits across the state each month, with an average per-person benefit of about











where weekPFDt is a dummy taking a value of 1 when day t falls in the week after PFD
distribution and zero otherwise, amountPFDt is the amount of PFD distributed as part of
the first direct deposit (in millions of 2016 USD) measured in deviations from the average
amount, weekSNAPt is a dummy taking a value of 1 when day t is in the week following
Alaskan SNAP distribution, and amountSNAPt are the SNAP payments made to Alaskans for
the month that t falls measured in deviations from their average.8 As before, W is a vector of
weather control variables, Mt is a vector of month-by-year effects, and τ is a vector of special
dates and day-of-week effects. For this specification, we drop the day-of-month polynomial
trend that captures intra-month cyclicality since we want to instead estimate this variation
as part of weekSNAP . The interactive effect of weekSNAPt × amountSNAPt isolates the SNAP
payment from other first-of-the-month effects (e.g. other income receipt, rent payments, etc)
which would otherwise have the potential to confound identification. Further, an important
source of variation in amountSNAPt is driven by a temporary benefit increase enacted as part
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 that was effective April 2009 to
8Data for the monthly SNAP distributions come from the the US Department of Agri-
culture’s State SNAP Tables.
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November 2013 (Hastings and Shapiro, 2018). During this period, Alaska was only mildly
affected by the economic downturn facing the rest of the country as oil prices remained at
record highs. We estimate the marginal effect of th PFD for only the first week following
its distribution since payments to check recipients in 2000-2009 period conflate estimation
of persistence effect with the effect of new money being dispersed after the first week. The
week-long duration for estimating the SNAP effect is chosen based on a combination of the
existing literature (e.g., Cotti et al., 2016; Foley, 2011, which use relatively short durations
of ten days or less), empirical evidence from our data that suggests SNAP effects dissipate
after one week, simplicity, and symmetry to the PFD estimate.
5 Results
5.1 Day-After Effects of the PFD
The estimated results for Eq. 1 across the five incident-categories of interest are presented
in Table 2. The coefficient estimate for “First Full Day After PFD Deposit” represents
the change in the average number of daily incidents one day after the PFD distribution.
For reference, the daily mean and standard deviation for each outcome variable are also
presented in the table. For incidents related to substance abuse, there is an increase of
approximately six reported incidents after the first PFD direct deposit, an increase of 14.1%
over the daily sample average. This result is statistically significant even after correcting
for multiple hypotheses testing across our outcomes. We find no statistically significant
day-after effects in incidents of violence, property crime, or calls for medical assistance.
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Incidents of loud parties and noise violations show about a 1-incident decrease. However, this
result is not robust to model specification or multiple hypothesis test corrections. Compared
to the holidays that we estimate as controls, the increase in same-day substance abuse
incidents from the PFD distribution is slightly larger than the increase on the 4th of July
and roughly half the increase on New Years Day/Eve, two holidays that are notorious for
excessive consumption of controlled substances.9
5.2 Persistence in the PFD Effect
Estimates of the PFD effect at each week interval, as well as their 95% confidence intervals,
using the 2010-2016 sample are presented in Figure 1.10 Daily substance-abuse incidents
9Table A.2 in the Appendix presents estimates of all holiday and other special days of
the year for reference. Appendix Table A.3 presents results with a more parsimonious set
of month-by-year and day-of-week controls (omitting the day-of-month polynomial, weather
controls, and special days); these results yield the same inferences with the exception of party
and noise noted above. Appendix Table A.7 presents results for two sub-sample periods,
2000-2009 and 2010-2016; the latter sub-sample is used in the persistence analysis. The
effect magnitudes across outcomes are roughly equivalent over these two periods.
10Table A.6 presents the tabular results. Daily-level persistence estimates are presented
in Figure A.2. Table A.6 also presents results estimated on the full 2000-2016 sample period
as a check for sensitivity to the sample period. In the full sample, property crimes see
statistically significant reductions for four weeks after the first direct deposit. In contrast,
these reductions are statistically significant for only two weeks in the 2010-2016 sample. This
result is consistent with our reasoning for narrowing the sample: the longer-lived reductions
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show significant increases for the first three weeks following distribution. These incidents
are approximately 20.2% more frequent than the daily sample average in the first week,
14.1% in the second, and 7.5% in the third. Over the entire 28-day post-PFD window we
study, substance abuse calls are approximately 10% higher (on average) on these days than
other days during the year. Not only is the effect persistent for these weeks following the
distribution, there is no evidence to suggest the effect is offset by reductions in substance calls
in weeks three and four. Thus, the estimated positive and persistent effect for substance-
abuse indicates a net increase, as opposed to a inter-temporal substitution, in substance-
abuse incidents from the cash payment. This finding is consistent with previous findings
of increased drug-related mortalities (Riddell and Riddell, 2006; Dobkin and Puller, 2007)
and alcohol purchases (Castellari et al., 2017) associated with welfare and social security
payments.11
With an extended time window, we find that average daily police activity related to
property crime experiences a significant decline for the two weeks after the PFD is issued,
in the full sample could be due to new individuals receiving their payments for the first time
via check and not the lasting effects of the first distribution.
11A potential concern here is evidence of a pre-trend in substance-abuse incidents before
the PFD is distributed (Figure 1). However, the week-of-distribution effect still positively
deviates from the extrapolated pre-trend. Further, we find that alternative specifications
using seasonal controls mitigate this pre-trend, suggesting that the pre-tend is picking up
seasonal trends in substance-abuse crimes. Regardless, the findings are consistent with the
conclusion that the payment has a small (but statistically measurable) effect on substance
abuse crimes.
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with an average daily decrease of 15.2% and 10.3% in the first and second week after payment,
respectively. The significant week-after effect is largely driven by decreased activities during
days that experience above-average property crimes (i.e., Monday to Wednesday). Like
incidents of substance-abuse, this effect is not offset in the later periods, indicating a net
decline in property crime, which is consistent with past findings of declines in property crime
associated with the timing of benefit payments (Carr and Packham, 2018; Foley, 2011) and
improvements in economic conditions more generally (Lin, 2008; Gould et al., 2002; Bignon
et al., 2017). Further, these reductions imply that the income effect dominates the potential
“loot” effect of a cash transfer, at least over the examined time horizon. Over the full 28-day
post-PFD window, the average daily reduction in property crime is 8%.
Like property crime, medical assistance from the Anchorage Police Department also shows
response in the extended time period not seen on the first full day after payment (Table 2).
Specifically, we observe a 9% increase in the 28-day post-PFD window. Note however that
these requests do not represent the universe of 911 calls regarding medical emergencies. They
only represent requests for medical assistance from police from other city agencies.
5.3 Variation in the Size of the PFD
From Eq. 3, the marginal effect of an additional $100 million in first-day cash from the
PFD is β2 + 2 × β3 ×Amount. We evaluate the marginal effect at the sample average PFD
dispersement, which is approximately $697 million in 2016 dollars (Table 3). For a $100
million dollar increase in the PFD (14% above the average distribution), the number of
calls requesting police to assist with medical issues increases by 0.35 calls per day (about
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a 2% increase relative to the daily sample average). In addition, substance-abuse incidents
experience approximately a one incident-per-day increase, or a 2% increase over the daily
sample average, indicating an elasticity of 0.14, which is consistent with the finding that
alcohol is a normal good.12 While a variety of factors could explain the higher substance
abuse incidents with higher PFD payments, our findings are consistent with the finding that
cash aid creates “full wallets” that can exacerbate substance abuse problems (Dobkin and
Puller, 2007).
Despite the existence of a negative average effect on property crimes, the marginal ef-
fect of the size of the PFD is not statistically significant. A few different explanations are
possible for why higher distribution amounts do not result in further reductions in property
crime. First, based on the figures we cite in Table 1, it is possible that the annual fluc-
tuations in the PFD are not large enough to cause additional decreases in property crime
activity. Second, it’s possible that the PFD amounts observed in our sample identify a region
of the income/property-crime relationship where there are diminishing returns to income.
For instance, Loughran et al. (2013) find that the illegal wage rate among individuals who
engage in criminal activity is $929 per week, which is approximately equal to the lowest
12Although Evans and Popova (2017) present evidence from across the world that cash
transfers are not consistently used for alcohol or tobacco, evidence from the United States,
suggests that alcohol is a normal good Decker and Schwartz (2000). Dasso et al. (2014) also
refer to alcohol as a “temptation good”, a term used by Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010)
to refer to “goods that generate positive utility for the self that consumes them, but not for
any previous self that anticipates that they will be consumed in the future.”
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per-person PFD received over the years in our sample (Table 1).13 Thus, fluctuations in the
amount distributed may not reduce the number of property crimes given that the smallest
PFD amount is almost as high as the earnings a skilled criminal can earn in a week. This
potential explanation is consistent with Mocan and Bali (2010), who evaluate the effect of
unemployment on crime and find that most of the impact of unemployment is observed in
pulling people into crime, rather than increasing the number of crimes of those who are
already committing crimes. Finally, it is possible that the loot effect at higher PFD amounts
offsets any additional income effect.
Altogether, the estimated marginal effects have two important implications. First, they
provide support for our earlier results as they use additional exogenous variation to further
isolate the PFD from any early-October effects. Second, since the socially undesirable out-
comes of substance abuse and medical-assist instances are increasing in distribution size, but
the socially desirable outcome of reduced property crime is not, there are implied gains from
spreading the payments over the year.
13Loughran et al. (2013) also note that there is considerable skew in the data (s.d. =
$1,491). A recent paper by Nguyen and Loughran (2017) reaches a similar conclusion that
the distributions of self-report criminal activity are asymmetric and right-skewed, with long
right tails. In one sample, they find average weekly criminal wage of $1,470 (median $669),
whereas in the other sample the reported average weekly criminal wage was $914 (median
$316).
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5.4 Comparison to Non-universal/In-kind Payments
In this section, we compare our estimated effects to those for a particular non-universal,
in-kind transfer receipt, food stamps (SNAP). As previously discussed, SNAP and the PFD
differ in two important respects. First, the universal nature of the PFD makes the average
PFD recipient quite different than the average SNAP recipient. This is true with respect
to both income (by definition) and across other sociodemographic dimensions. While Grant
and Dawson (1996) provide evidence that the welfare receiving population does not system-
atically differ from non-receivers in their alcohol abuse, Pollack and Reuter (2006) find that
drug usage was higher among welfare-receiving individuals. Further, Hastings and Wash-
ington (2010) show that alcohol and tobacco purchases for SNAP recipients (relative to
non-recipients) are highest soon after SNAP receipt. For these reasons, we would expect
substance-abuse crimes to be more elastic with respect to SNAP payments than PFD pay-
ments. The second difference between SNAP and the PFD is the in-kind (or conditional)
nature of the SNAP payments. SNAP recipients may spend food stamps disproportionately
on eligible food items relative to other sources of income: thus, substance-abuse incidents
may be more elastic with respect to unrestricted payments like the PFD.14
Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients of interest from Eq. 4. The main effects
suggest that substance-abuse incidents are more frequent during the week in which SNAP
payments are distributed while property crime incidents are lower the week after the PFD
14Cuffey et al. (2016) in a survey/meta-analysis of fifty-nine papers and Hastings and
Shapiro (2018) both find notable gap between the marginal propensity to purchase eligible
food from food stamps than from other income.
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is distributed. We note, however, that this only suggestive as the main effect estimates for
SNAP (SNAPWeek) are not separately identified from other first-of-the-month occurrences,
although our estimates for reductions in property crime is not dramatically different from
Foley (2011).15 Similarly, Dobkin and Puller (2007) find an increase in hospital admissions
related to drug abuse during the first few days of the month attributable to receipt of
supplemental security income programs (SSI). While their results are consistent with the
results we find for medical assistance and substance abuse incidents, we note that SSI is
issued as a cash transfer while SNAP benefits are in-kind benefits.
Turning to the marginal effect estimates, an increase of $1 million in the size of the
monthly SNAP distribution is associated with a statistically significant increase of 0.46 in
the average number of daily substance abuse incidents over the first week, compared to an
increase of only 0.002 daily substance abuse incidents in the first week from a $1 million
increase in the size of the PFD distribution. Medical assistance incidents are also responsive
to the distribution sizes of both payments, with an additional $1 million resulting in 0.001
and 0.064 increase in calls for the PFD and SNAP, respectively. Given the different scales of
the PFD and SNAP programs, the lower panel of Table 4 facilitates the comparison of these
two programs by presenting the marginal effects in elasticity terms and tests the hypothesis
that the difference in crime-payment elasticities for SNAP versus the PFD is statistically
different from zero. We find such a difference in response of substance abuse to payment
15Foley (2011) finds property crime to be 3.8% lower in the first 10 days after SNAP
distribution; we find a 2.5% decrease. While our results are somewhat smaller, this is intuitive
considering that Anchorage has a lower participation rate in SNAP that the average city in
Foley’s study (which were sampled based on high participation rates in the program).
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receipt, but not for the other categories of activities.
The goal of comparing SNAP- to PFD-related effects is to highlight the differential effects
of universal cash payments relative to those previously studied for non-universal and in-kind
payments. The more responsive nature of substance-abuse crimes with respect to SNAP
payments suggests that the universal nature of the PFD more than offsets any relative
difference arising from the unconditional nature of the PFD, as per the discussion above.
However, we note that there are several other potential explanations for why substance-abuse
incidents are relatively more responsive to SNAP payments. PFD and SNAP payments are
quite different in size, and the effect that we are trying to estimate may be highly non-
linear—e.g., a $150 SNAP payment leads to increases in crime, while a $1,000 PFD payment
does not. In addition, the scale of the PFD program has the potential to induce general
equilibrium effects and create demand for labor (as found by Jones and Marinescu, 2018),
which could attenuate the crime response from the PFD payments.
5.5 Robustness of findings
To further scrutinize our findings, we test whether similarly sized effects for the PFD can be
found during other one-week periods of the year. For this test, we estimate Eq. 1 iteratively,
redefining treatment for a new week-of-year at each step. Placebo treatment weeks are
defined starting at the true treatment week and working outward within each year. Because
of this definition, the weeks at the beginning and end of each year will not necessarily contain
seven days. Also, as the number of weeks before and after the true dispersement week varies
from year to year, we will estimate more than 52 placebo effects. Figure 2 plots a histogram
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of the magnitude of these placebo treatment effects for each outcome, along with the fraction
of observed effects that are greater in magnitude than the actual treatment. The results of
the placebo test are consistent with the those presented in the main results tables. Substance
abuse and property crime are both found to have true treatments in the 10th percentile of all
estimated effects. Placebo effects for these outcomes of similar or larger magnitude are also
easily explained by spillovers from holidays or log accounting issues from daylight savings
time.
A potential threat to identification is a change in the level of police enforcement activity
around the time of PFD distribution: if APD anticipates a swell in activity around the time
of the distribution, it may increase its presence and observe more crime taking place (whether
the actual underlying level changes or not). Our conversations with the APD suggest that
staffing effort does not change around the time of PFD distribution. Further, most of the
activities of interest in our analysis are so-called “calls for service”. Calls for service are
initiated by members of the community (e.g., calling 911, hailing officer in the field, or
request by other agency), in contrast to “self-initiated” activities which are more responsive
to changing enforcement. In Appendix C we find no evidence that the total number of
calls for service, self-initiated activities, or their their ratio change on PFD distribution day,




Our analysis finds an increase in the number of substance-abuse incidents and a decrease in
the number of property crimes in the weeks immediately following the PFD distribution; a
remaining question is whether such changes can be considered as economically significant.
Estimates of the persistence of the PFD effect (Figure 1 and Table A.6) indicate that 126
more substance-abuse incidents and 77 fewer property crimes are realized over the four weeks
after the PFD is distributed, on average. On an annual basis, this constitutes only a 1.05%
increase and 0.61% decreases in substance-abuse incidents and property crimes, respectively
(Table 5). Further, many of the substance-abuse incidents that are attributable to the PFD
constitute crimes that may not be overly costly to society. For example, decomposing the
substance-abuse category into its individual components indicates that our substance-abuse
results are being driven by increases in crimes such as “drunk problem” and “drunk trans-
port” (See Appendix Table A.5). To understand the potential cost of such crimes, we com-
pute estimates of the costs associated with the increase in alcohol-related crimes and compare
them to the cost savings associated with the reduction in property crimes (see Appendix B
for more detail). We provide a low-cost case, which assumes the cost of crime includes only
tangible costs and a high-cost case, which assumes that the cost of crime includes tangible
and intangible costs.16 The high cost case also incorporates the probability that substance
16From McCollister et al. (2010), tangible costs include the victim’s economic loss (medical
costs, lost earnings, and property loss), criminal justice cost, and the opportunity cost for
the criminal from foregone legitimate pursuits. In contrast, intangible costs incorporate pain
and suffering.
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consumption induces additional crime.17 Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that
the cost of increased alcohol-related incidents ranges between $4.5 thousand and $3.9 million
over the four weeks after the distribution, depending on whether both direct and indirect
costs of alcohol-related crimes are included in the calculation and whether the costs include
intangibles. In contrast, we estimate the cost savings from the decrease in property crimes
to be between $333 thousand and $419 thousand. Together, these estimates suggest that the
net effect of crime attributable to the PDF lies between +$329 thousand and -$3.4 million
(Table 5). While the sign of the estimated net welfare effect depends on our assumptions
about which costs to include, we interpret the economic significance of the welfare effect
as unambiguously small. In comparison to the size of the total PFD payment received by
Anchorage residents, for instance, the welfare changes associated with crime range from a
0.17% savings to a 1.78% loss across the low and high cost cases. In per capita terms, these
changes are between a $1.54 per person savings to a $16.12 loss, relative to 2016 per-person
PFD amount of $1,022.
Despite the relatively small calculated welfare impact, there may be potential to reduce
the impact of PFD-related crime by restructuring the timing of the PFD. For instance, our
results suggest that substance-abuse incidents increase with the size of the PFD, but no
further reductions in property crimes occur. This implies that there may be benefits to
staggering the PFD payments over the year: smaller amounts may reduce the negative “full
17Alcohol-related crimes have direct costs (e.g., police resources to manage disorderly
individuals, as in Rajkumar and French, 1997), but also indirect costs via an increased
likelihood of committing other crimes while under-the-influence (e.g., the alcohol-violence
link shown by Lindo et al., 2018).
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wallet” effect without increasing financially motivated crimes. However, as the size of our
results are small, any gains from reducing substance-abuse incidences should be weighted
against any administrative costs associated with issuing multiple payments a year. In ad-
dition, the relationship between payment size and property crimes is not well-identified for
smaller payments that lie outside of our observed sample of historical PFD payments; thus,
several small payments may not have the same effect on property crime as we estimate in
our analysis. Nevertheless, our findings are consistent with a number of recent papers on
conditional cash transfers showing gains from staggering payments (Dobkin and Puller, 2007;
Carr and Packham, 2018). The gains in our case, however, are smaller due to the universal
nature of the payment and the difference in the treated population. While the deviations
we find are small on an annualized basis, they do suggest that future implementations of
universal income should test alternative disbursement policies that maximize the reductions
of financially motivated crimes while reducing substance-abuse activity, which can result in
crime.
7 Conclusion
We present the first comprehensive analysis of the crime consequences of an unconditional
and universal transfer using the world’s only continuous universal income program, Alaska’s
Permanent Fund Dividend. Our findings provide several new insights for the impact of cash
transfers on the behavior of recipients. We show that the recipient population is responsive
to an unconditional and anticipated income receipt across several dimensions of interest.
Over the four week period after the PFD distribution, we find an average daily reduction in
29
property crime of 8%, an average daily increase in substance abuse crime of 10%, and an
average daily increase in medical assistance calls of 9%. Our substance abuse results confirm
the mechanisms underlying previous work that finds increases in substance-abuse-related
morbidity and mortality following cash transfers from SSI and welfare programs (Dobkin
and Puller, 2007; Riddell and Riddell, 2006). However, our results stand in contrast to other
work that finds more limited, or even negative, substance-abuse-related responses to cash
transfers (Cuffey et al., 2016). Additionally, we find substance abuse and medical calls for
assistance are responsive to the total size of the payment program (in terms of dollars) but
property crimes are not. Our property crime results, in general, support previous work that
finds a decrease in property crime following SNAP payments in twelve US cities (Foley,
2011). The observed changes we describe above are, however, modest as the increase in
substance-abuse crime is 1.05% of the annual level, while the declines in property crime are
-0.61%.
Our results also contribute a new dimension to the growing literature on universal basic
income. We show the potential for such programs to produce both positive and negative
social consequences. On the negative side, we show that unconditional cash transfers do
in fact increase recipient’s consumption of “temptation goods,” or controlled substances (as
measured by policing activities). On the positive side, we show that a universal cash trans-
fer also decreases property crime. These positive and negative effects are quite different in
magnitude (on a per dollar/per person basis) than the estimated effects of other transfers
which have been the subject of past work. In our analysis, when the PFD and food stamp
(SNAP) program are compared, we find that the SNAP-distribution elasticity of substance
abuse calls is over four times larger than that of the PFD. The results of this comparison
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provide quantitative evidence regarding the fundamentally different nature of universal pay-
ments from payments such as food stamps or social security that have been the subject
of many past studies. As such, generalizing the findings of conditional, non-universal, and
in-kind transfer literature to more universal payments may be problematic due to the differ-
ences in the average recipient’s response. Indeed, the small estimated crime-related costs of
the PFD suggest that crime-related concerns of a universal cash transfer program may be
unwarranted.
Finally, we show that lessons from the PFD can potentially be very useful in understand-
ing the consequences associated with UBI implementations. Our focus in this paper has
been on a subset of behavioral responses (i.e., criminal activity) as measured by daily police
activity records. Clearly, the goals of UBI have far reaches and some are beyond the scope of
this paper. The length of time the PFD has been in existence provides a unique opportunity
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2000 4-Oct Wed 390,312 96% 2,737 100% 1,030
2001 10-Oct Wed 404,247 96% 2,508 100% 970
2002 9-Oct Wed 424,490 97% 2,056 100% 844
2003 8-Oct Wed 444,268 94% 1,445 100% 605
2004 12-Oct Tue 448,642 94% 1,169 100% 491
2005 12-Oct Wed 459,004 94% 1,039 100% 448
2006 4-Oct Wed 476,775 93% 1,318 39% 227
2007 3-Oct Wed 493,997 93% 1,915 45% 395
2008 12-Sep Fri 497,739 92% 3,644 100% 1,670
2009 8-Oct Thu 514,217 93% 1,460 100% 702
2010 7-Oct Thu 527,868 92% 1,410 100% 684
2011 6-Oct Thu 523,756 91% 1,253 100% 594
2012 4-Oct Thu 518,334 90% 918 100% 429
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2013 3-Oct Thu 512,955 89% 927 100% 426
2014 2-Oct Thu 518,986 88% 1,910 100% 874
2015 1-Oct Thu 532,672 87% 2,098 100% 976
2016 6-Oct Thu 534,156 89% 1,022 100% 484
Mean 483,672 92% 1,966 93% 697
PFD dates, number of recipients, and amounts come from Alaska Department of
Revenue’s Permanent Fund Dividend Annual reports. Total dispersed on first day
(in 2016 USD) are author’s calculations based on fully untarnished payments made
to recipients on the first payout date.
aThe fraction of ungarnished payments issued. Garnishments may be involuntary
(e.g. child support or uncollected government fees) or voluntary (e.g. tax exempt
college savings or charitable contribution).
Table 2: Change in reported incidents, first day after PFD distribution, 2000-2016
Change in daily incident count by category:
Violence Substance Property Party Medical
Assist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First Full Day −0.087 6.163∗∗∗ −0.656 −1.022∗ 0.914
After PFD Deposit (0.948) (1.964) (1.504) (0.603) (0.885)
P-value [0.927] [0.002] [0.663] [0.090] [0.302]
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Bonferroni P-val [1.0000] [0.0086] [1.0000] [0.4498] [1.0000]
Mean Daily Call Count 13.63 43.59 33.70 10.08 14.38
St. dev Call Count 4.46 13.45 9.46 6.68 5.70
Weather Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holiday Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-Month Poly. Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month x Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,193 6,193 6,193 6,193 6,193
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.602 0.482 0.693 0.516
Note: Newey-West Robust Errors in parentheses. Unadjusted p-values: ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Violence includes: Homicide, assault, and sexual assault. Substance category includes:
incidents of driving while intoxicated, drunk and disorderly, drug possession, hit-and-
runs, and liquor law violations. Property crime includes burglary, robbery, theft, and
shoplifting. Party includes noise violation and loud/disruptive party calls. Medical
assistance calls only include police assistance of medical aid for another department.
Complete list of holidays accompanies discussion of Eq. 1. Weather includes third order
effects for temperature, precipitation, and snow depth. Bonferroni p-values correct for
multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 4: Comparison of PFD and SNAP payment effects by category, 2000-2016
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Dependent variable:
Violence Substance Property Party Medical
Assist
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SNAP Week 0.121 5.298∗∗∗ −0.834∗∗∗ −0.132 0.702∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.376) (0.230) (0.118) (0.136)
PFD Week −0.283 3.133∗∗ −2.890∗∗∗ −0.150 0.660∗∗
(0.415) (1.243) (0.652) (0.299) (0.332)
SNAP Week x 0.033 0.462∗∗∗ −0.016 0.019 0.064∗∗
SNAP Amount (0.032) (0.099) (0.053) (0.027) (0.031)
PFD Week x 0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 −0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
PFD Amount (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0003)
SNAP Elasticity 0.026 0.117 -0.005 0.021 0.049
PFD Elasticity 0.027 0.038 0.012 -0.050 0.051
SNAP-PFD Elasticity -0.000 0.079 -0.017 0.071 -0.002
F-test P-value [0.990] [0.013] [0.440] [0.062] [0.942]
Bonferroni P-value [1.000] [0.066] [1.000] [0.249] [1.000]
Weather Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Holiday Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-Month Poly. Trend No No No No No
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Month x Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,193 6,193 6,193 6,193 6,193
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.598 0.482 0.693 0.515
Note: Newey-West Robust Errors in parentheses. Unadjusted p-values: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
Coefficients in upper panel estimated by Eq. 4. Lower panel presents calculated elasticity
values and hypothesis test that the difference between elasticities is zero. Bonferroni p-values
correct for multiple hypothesis testing. Violence includes: Homicide, assault, and sexual
assault. Substance category includes: incidents of driving while intoxicated, drunk and
disorderly, drug possession, hit-and-runs, and liquor law violations. Property crime includes
burglary, robbery, theft, and shoplifting. Party includes noise violation and loud/disruptive
party calls. Medical assistance calls only include police assistance of medical aid for another
department. Complete list of holidays accompanies discussion of Eq. 1. Weather includes
third order effects for temperature, precipitation, and snow depth.
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Persistence effects estimated over the 2010-2016 sample by Eq. 2. Estimates show the daily
change in number calls of particular type averaged over a given week. “PFD” week
includes days 1-7 after the PFD direct deposit date; weeks -1 and 1 are the 1-7 days before
and the 8-14 days after, respectively. Violence includes: Homicide, assault, and sexual
assault. Substance category includes: incidents of driving while intoxicated, drunk and
disorderly, drug possession, hit-and-runs, and liquor law violations. Property crime
includes burglary, robbery, theft, and shoplifting. Party includes noise violation and
loud/disruptive party calls. Medical assistance calls only include police assistance of
medical aid for another department.
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Distribution of placebo effects (bars), true treatment effect (vertical line), and associated
true treatment empirical P-value.
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Table 3: Marginal Effect of Additional $100 million PFD in First Week, 2000-2016
Violence Substance Property Party Medical
Assist
Marginal Effect -0.017 1.074** -0.347 -0.008 0.35***
(0.121) (0.422) (0.214) (0.103) (0.096)
P-value [0.888] [0.011] [0.104] [0.939] [0.000]
Bonferroni P-value [1.000] [0.044] [0.313] [1.000] [0.001]
Note: Newey-West Robust Errors in parentheses. Unadjusted p-values:
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Deviation from average first week effect given a $100 million change in
distribution size. Estimated by Eq. 3. Violence includes: Homicide, as-
sault, and sexual assault. Substance category includes: incidents of driv-
ing while intoxicated, drunk and disorderly, drug possession, hit-and-runs,
and liquor law violations. Property crime includes burglary, robbery, theft,
and shoplifting. Party includes noise violation and loud/disruptive party
calls. Medical assistance calls only include police assistance of medical aid
for another department.
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Table 5: Annualized & Monetized Changes from Cumulative 4-week Effect
Violence Substance Property Party Medical
Assist
Annual Incidents, 2016 5,128 11,971 12,744 2,741 7,962
4-weeks After PFD -16.31 125.6 -77.41 4.91 37.46
% Change After PFD -0.32% 1.05% -0.61% 0.18% 0.47%
95% Confidence [-0.83,0.20] [0.63,1.47] [-0.92,-0.29] [-0.52,0.88] [0.05,0.89]
Social Cost, $/Incident
Substance Property
Low Cost 35.92 4,305.06
High Cost 30,767.16 5,422.67
Total Social Cost, $1,000
Substance Property Net
Low Cost 4.51 -333.25 -328.74
High Cost 3,864.36 -419.77 3,444.59
Low social cost assumes the cost of crime comes only from its tangible components (i.e.
victim cost, criminal justice system costs, and crime career costs) and that alcohol abuse
does not induce any additional crime. High social cost assumes cost of crime is inclusive of
these factors, intangible cost (i.e. victim pain and suffering), and crime induced via alcohol
consumption. See Appendix B for details.
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